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1  Introduction
Whilst the question of ethical expertise is troubling in itself, more specific concerns 
can be raised when it is considered in relation to bioethics. Whilst bioethics is an 
inter- or, at least, multi- disciplinary field its dominant mode of thought is that of 
applied or practical ethics, understood as a particular form or mode of philosophical 
reasoning or as ‘ethical rationality’ in the analytic tradition. The claims or, at least, 
aims of this mode of thought suggest that right and wrong, good and bad, can be 
objectively determined through the unforced force of the better argument, to use a 
Habermasian turn of phrase. However, the very notion that there may be such a thing 
as expertise in applied or practical (bio)ethics1 indicates that not all individuals are in 
the same position vis-à-vis ‘the better argument.’ It would seem that if (bio)ethical 
expertise is anything, then it involves knowledge of the bioethical literature coupled 
with a particular competence, ability or skill in the articulation, evaluation and adju-
dication of ethical arguments. If this is the case then it would seem that, were they to 
exist, experts in (bio)ethics would present a prima facie threat to the moral autonomy 
of individuals. If, say, some (bio)ethicists are experts in regards particular ethical 
questions that arise in the context of healthcare then it would seem that healthcare 
professionals ought to defer to them when encountering them in practice.
1 In this essay I use the term (bio)ethics to mean the discussion and analysis of bioethical topics in 
accordance with the methodological prescriptions and philosophical presumptions of applied or 
practical ethics. The term bioethics denotes the broader inter- or multi-disciplinary field.
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Related concerns about the implications of (bio)ethical expertise arise in the con-
text of democratic politics and policy-making. Such concerns are distinct from 
those that have been addressed to scientific expertise. Responses to the problem of 
scientific expertise either assert the value neutrality of science and the value-laden 
nature of politics or distinguish between scientific values and the other values that 
have a legitimate role to play in democratic debate and policy-making. In so doing 
the threat of technocracy – or epistocracy (Evans 2014) – can be countered whilst 
the independence and political autonomy of both science and democratic govern-
ment can be maintained. However, the notion that there may be experts in ethics 
threatens to resurrect both the promise and the threat of technocracy. As Mari Levitt 
(2003) puts it ‘what is the point of listening to the public when they have neither 
scientific nor ethical expertise?’ Furthermore one might think similarly for any 
other group, such as politicians, who are similarly lacking in such expertise. Whether 
or not they are truly value-free, if scientists can provide the facts and ethicists the 
(broader) values why not embrace a technocratic approach to government?
In this essay my aim is to consider something of these broader questions and to 
do so in relation to the politics of the particular framework of expertise I have made 
use of in my previous analysis of (bio)ethical expertise (Emmerich 2015a, 2016). 
The conception of expertise I have previously worked with is the one Collins and 
Evans (2007) have pursued under Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEE) 
research programme and as part of what they call the third wave of science studies 
more generally. More recently Collins et al. (2010) have turned their attention to the 
political dimension of their work, arguing for what they call ‘elective modernism.’ 
Thus, the purpose of the below is to consider if, having adopted their theory of 
expertise, my account of (bio)ethical expertise can or should be associated with a 
similar political perspective or if the reorientation of expertise to the domain of (bio)
ethics rather than science presents differing tensions in the socio-political exercise 
of expertise. In order to do so I first present a précis of my account of (bio)ethical 
expertise which is then followed by a brief summary of elective modernism. I then 
discuss whether elective modernism offers any insight into the socio-political uses 
of (bio)ethical expertise and its legitimacy.
2  A Socio-logical Account of (Bio)Ethical Expertise
The philosophical literature offers two different perspectives on ethical expertise 
and, albeit in their own specific manners, both raise the kind of concerns I gestured 
at above. Furthermore, as one is rooted within the discourse of modern moral phi-
losophy (the contemporary account)2 whilst the other is located with the  (neo-)
2 What I am calling the contemporary account is often rejected. Such rejection does not necessarily 
indicate a preference for the traditional account. Rather it involves a denial of ethical expertise per se. 
Those who make this move include individuals who could be seen as experts in ethics (Cowley 2005; 
Archard 2011). It seems to me that such rejections are primarily motivated by concerns about the 
(unethical or simply unpalatable) normative implications of ethical expertise, concerns that are, for 
the most part, a function of certain meta-ethical commitments. We should, instead, recognize that 
(bio)ethical expertise is a fact of contemporary society, modern cultural and democratic politics.
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Aristotelian tradition (the traditional account), they not only significantly differ 
from one another, but would seem to be mutually incompatible. In addition both 
accounts are problematic. A significant failing of the contemporary account is the 
overly intellectualist nature of the view it presents. The contemporary account’s 
adherence to ‘the principle of phenomenalism’ would seem to be incompatible with 
broader understandings of our (moral) psychology more generally (Narvaez and 
Lapsley 2005: 141). Whilst this could be taken to suggest that the contemporary 
account is on the right track – perhaps we should not expect ethical expertise to 
reflect our ordinary moral psychology – it does reflect the fact that it is inconsistent 
with broader research on the nature of expertise in general. Whilst some who work 
from within a neo-Aristotelian framework have developed the traditional account in 
the light of such expertise research (Stichter 2007; Swartwood 2013; Musschenga 
2015) their view of ethical experts is primarily connected to the way some individu-
als – who we might call moral exemplars – lead their lives. In this view ethical 
expertise is less a matter an individual’s cognitive, analytic or reflective abilities 
than it is a function of their virtues, their dispositions or, in a somewhat more sophis-
ticated account, their ‘social intelligence’ (Snow 2009). Thus, whether it is consid-
ered in relation to their personal or their professional lives, what the traditional view 
offers is not something that reflects the behaviour or practices of all – or even most – 
(bio)ethicists or moral philosophers.
Adopting the framework of expertise – or expertises – developed by Collins and 
Evans (2007) I have addressed the conundrum of ethical expertise elsewhere 
(Emmerich 2015a, 2016). Briefly, we should distinguish between morality, and the 
ubiquitous expertise of all moral agents, and ethics, and the specialist ethics exper-
tise of academic (bio)ethicists. The former is akin to philosophy’s traditional 
account and, whilst it could be called a characterological or a virtue based theory, I 
prefer to talk of embodied dispositions and habitus. This is because if such expertise 
is ubiquitous then no claims about the moral standing of the bearers can be made or 
derived. The expertise lies in the agent’s ability to negotiate the moral order or ethos 
of their socio-cultural (or political) context with ease. In so doing they may act in 
ways that are right or wrong, good or bad. Moral failings do not indicate a lack of 
expertise per se – despite a tendency towards rationalisation, post hoc justifications 
and a degree of ‘denial’ we are all too aware of our own moral failings. Thus ubiq-
uitous moral experts need not be considered exemplars or moral saints. Rather they 
are associated with the ability to recognise and negotiate the moral landscapes we 
inhabit, something that both morally good and bad individuals are able to do.3
3 Proof of this point can be found if one considers the philosophical literature on moral practice, 
where we find interesting sub-field in which the significance of psychopaths is discussed. Here the 
psychopath is held to be an individual who does not feel the compulsion towards morally good or 
right action – or away from morally bad or wrong actions – felt be the rest of the population. It is 
not that they are unaware of the moral landscape; even lacking any moral compunction, it seems 
they can negotiate it all too well. Thus psychopaths do not lack ubiquitous moral expertise; rather 
they lack the normative motivations (or ‘conatus’) required for them to act morally rather than 
immorally. Similarly consider the ubiquitous moral expertise of an individual situated in a socio-
cultural or political context they consider morally abhorrent, but the structural dictates of which 
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It is worth noting a few additional features of this account. First, as implied, the 
moral order varies across different fields. Thus we find moral subcultures in which 
some are experts whilst others are not. Healthcare is an interesting example of one 
such subculture. Healthcare professionals have a ubiquitous moral expertise that 
relates to the respective practices they are engaged in. This is linked to, but differs 
from, their ordinary or everyday ubiquitous moral expertise. Second, whilst some 
try to differentiate them (cf. Smith 2009), the moral order or ethos of a field is, in 
essence, co-extensive with its normative order. Thus the notion of ubiquitous moral 
expertise includes practices usually differentiated from morality per se. Examples 
include etiquette, disciplinary norms and, indeed, any and all social structures that 
normative influence the social practices associated with a particular field. Both ana-
lysts and actors can, of course, focus on the moral order as a domain or sub-set of 
the normative order, and accord it a certain degree of priority or importance. 
Nevertheless, no formal or analytic distinction can be defended in theory or in prin-
ciple; the moral and the normative are integrated within the concept of ubiquitous 
moral expertise. Finally, whilst ubiquitous moral expertise may include a reflective 
component – after all the exchange of reasons is central to what we might call our 
moral economy  – it is primarily an unreflective phenomenon. Thus ubiquitous 
moral experts need not be able to justify themselves. Or, at least, they need only 
justify themselves according with the social norms of the contexts – or field(s) – 
they inhabit. There is, however, no need for them to be able to justify themselves in 
accordance with the norms of some other field, such as those we find in academic 
(bio)ethics.4
This conception of ubiquitous moral expertise contrasts with the specialist exper-
tise of the academic (bio)ethicist. First, such expertise can be decomposed into two 
elements, what Collins and Evans call contributory expertise and interactional 
expertise. The former are those that can contribute to a particular discipline. In this 
case, and for simplicity’s sake, this can be defined as those who write articles suit-
able for publication in the relevant journals. As all such individuals inhabit the field 
they also possess the ability to interact with their peers, and to do so in such a way 
so as to be recognised as members of the field. The nature of contributory expertise 
is such that it is predicated on this interactional ability.5 However, some individuals 
may develop the relevant interactional expertise or, at least, some level of such 
expertise without becoming contributory experts. They have the ability to ‘pass’ in 
the field. Some science journalists are good examples of this phenomenon, as are 
they are forced to obey. Thinking that such individuals lack the ubiquitous moral expertise required 
to do what is right, or that this disproves the notion of ubiquitous moral expertise, is to miss the 
point entirely. A large component of ubiquitous moral expertise is constitute by ones moral percep-
tions (Zahle 2013, 2014). Psychopaths can be understood as being possessed of such perceptual 
abilities whilst lacking any compulsion to follow its dictates.
4 At least to some degree, these past two sentences account for the phenomena known as moral 
dumbfounding, see Emmerich (2016) for further discussion of this point.
5 The reason being that the process of becoming a contributory expert involves being socialized 
(and enculturated) into the relevant field. This involves the development of interactional expertise 
See: (Collins and Evans 2015).
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some sociologists of science.6 Such individuals cannot ‘walk the walk’ but can, 
nevertheless, ‘talk the talk.’ Of course, given the notion of language as a practice 
(Collins 2011), talk is an indispensible component of scientific practices (and, one 
might add, the practice of bioethics). Thus, the ability to talk the talk can be under-
stood as a matter of walking the talk (Collins and Evans 2007: chap. 4).7 Therefore, 
properly conceived, a specialist contributory expertise involves the ability to walk 
the talk as an indispensible part of walking the (broader) walk, whereas the ability 
of specialist interactional experts resides in their ability to walk the talk alone.
The notion of interactional expertise is, I have suggested, of particular important 
for a proper understanding of (bio)ethical expertise. In the first instance, if they are 
to understand the fields and domains they comment upon, (bio)ethicists must 
develop some degree of interactional expertise with those fields and domains. In 
some instances this may be a fairly weak requirement, as when comprehending the 
biology of foetal development in order to comment upon the ethics of abortion, 
whilst in others it may be more demanding, as when commenting upon the ethical 
complexities of medical practice.8 In the second instance, if we think that the point 
of bioethics is to influence those in other fields and domains, which is to say that if 
we think that the point of bioethics is to influence non-experts, then it would seem 
incumbent on the expert (bio)ethicist to develop the ability to effectively communi-
cate with such individuals. Such an ability would draw on the ubiquitous moral 
expertise of both expert (bio)ethicists and those to whom they address their remarks.
Such an account of (bio)ethical expertise demonstrates the need for (bio)ethicists 
to think about the broader moral order or ethos of the fields they comment upon. 
However, one could still maintain that the substantive and methodological advice, 
recommendations and arguments offered by the academic field of applied or practi-
cal (bio)ethics ought to be embraced as they are objectively superior those found 
elsewhere. If we are to offset the kinds of concerns raised in the introduction, what 
is required is the addition of one science studies’ most basic insights. Academic 
disciplines and scientific fields are (sub)cultures and, as such, they have moral 
orders, an ethos or a moral economy. Thus (epistemic) objectivity does not entail 
the absence of norms or values, rather objectivity “it is itself a code of values” 
(Daston and Galison 2007:  53). Scientific, indeed academic, disciplines entail 
that epistemology is fused with or wedded to an ethos (Daston 1995; Daston and 
Galison 2007:  204). This can be put another way. The generation of objective 
6 Part of the original impetus for the recognition of this sort of expertise was the abilities that one 
of the authors, Harry Collins, developed in relation to gravitational wave physics whilst conducting 
sociological research in this field (Collins and Evans 2007: 104–109).
7 So as to avoid any potential misinterpretation that might result from the negative connotations 
usually attached to the notion of being able to talk the talk (whilst being unable to walk the walk) 
the phrase ‘walk the talk’ is preferred by Collins and Evans (2007: chap. 4). It also makes clear that 
the ‘talk’ is very much part of the ‘walk’.
8 Some might think the order of these examples should be reversed. However, that is to underesti-
mate the degree to which we already possess a certain level of interactional expertise with the field 
of healthcare. After all, we have all been patients. Therefore the interactional expertise required of 
(bio)ethicists builds on their wider, preexisting and non-academic experiences.
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knowledge – or, indeed, any other type of knowledge – involves practices that are 
embedded within a specific social, cultural and historical context. Such knowledge 
is, therefore, necessarily dependant upon and informed by a particular normative or 
moral order. Neither science nor (bio)ethics is a value-free enterprise. They are both 
cultural phenomena.
3  Elective Modernism
What Collins and Evans have to offer, and what I have taken up, is a reconstruction 
of expertise. In their view this project is a necessity because, whilst wave 2 science 
studies has been highly successful in deconstructing science, we cannot do without 
the knowledge it provides. Therefore they propose a new direction for science stud-
ies – a third wave – one that they term Studies of Expertise and Experience. Whilst 
this is intended to compliment rather than replace Wave 2 research it is an attempt 
to move beyond what they see as the relatively naive impulse towards an ever 
increasing democratization of science. As such they aim to by provide “a set of tools 
for doing more than simply demanding ‘more participation’” (Collins et al. 2010: 
196). Their view is that we need to value, and balance between, democracy (popu-
lism) and expertise (technocracy). Elective Modernism is offered as one way in 
which a balance might be struck.
As such, elective modernism proposes that we (re)structure society by (re)orga-
nise the relationship between science and politics. It is a deceptively simple proposi-
tion that suggests we ought to “reconstruct the values of science” because “they are 
central to a good society” (Collins 2010). Rather than being seen as a resource – as, 
simply, a source of information or ‘facts’ – science is positioned as a key element of 
our contemporary – or modern – culture(s) (Collins and Evans 2007: 11), one that 
should be seen as worthy of our (political) respect.9 Contra the perspective of ‘sec-
ond wave’ science studies – where politics and science mix like wine and water – 
the third wave considers them immiscible or like oil and water (Collins et  al. 
2010: 194). This does not prevent science from being shot through by politics or 
with political concerns. Rather, it is to say that ‘politics’ is not part of what they call 
the ‘formative intentions’ of science. Whilst they acknowledge that the boundaries 
will always remain fuzzy, the notion ‘formative intentions’ is their thoroughly soci-
ological approach to distinguishing between science and non- or pseudo- science.
9 Democratic politics and policy making is said to be endangered by scientific expertise and ‘sci-
entism’ more generally. Collins and Evans (2007: 11), defend a particular kind of scientism – sci-
entism4 – that is summed up by the notion that science is an essential part of modern culture. Thus 
elective modernism is a form of scientism, but one that Collins and Evans defend. Similarly my 
work has been concerned by ‘ethicism’ as any articulation of (bio)ethical expertise must avoid the 
suggestion that we might abdicate our moral agency to a cadre of experts. The resolution I have 
adopted is analogous to Collins and Evans’ notion of scientism4. It is to see bioethics as, in 
essence, one part of modernity’s moral culture.
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Formative intentions are the motivating social, cultural and – particularly in the 
case of science – epistemological structures that define a field, a mode of social life 
or, as they prefer it, a form of life.10 They are the necessary – but not necessarily 
sufficient – components required if a particular mode of social life is to be possible. 
Thus, insofar as its funding must be determined via some political process and inso-
far as the relationship between different scientists will have a political component, 
politics remains a requirement for the contemporary existence of science. 
Nevertheless, politics does not form part of the fields formative intentions and is 
not, therefore, a component by definition. With this commitment Collins, Evans and 
Weinel found a distinction between science and politics and, on this basis, they can 
then engage in a normative discussion regarding the (re)configuration of their rela-
tionship. An important aspect of this is the way that they differentiate “between the 
technical and the political phases of technological decision-making in the public 
domain” (Collins et al. 2010: 186). Accordingly, whilst the political phase has prior-
ity or, at least, it has the final say in any decision- or policy-making process this does 
not mean it can seek to contrive, influence or otherwise “subvert the findings of the 
technical phase” (Collins et al. 2010: 188).11 Similarly, contributions – and contribu-
tors – to the technical phase need to be carefully configured so that they do not cross 
over into the political phase.
Collins, Evans and Weinel suggest that the “technical phase is informed by the 
formative intentions associated with the scientific form-of-life, whereas the political 
phase is concerned with the formative intentions associated with the politics of the 
wider society” (Collins et al. 2010: 188). As such, when contributing to the techni-
cal phase of policy-making process scientists should speak as scientists and not on 
the basis of their religious, political or otherwise non-scientific beliefs. Thus, the 
technical phase does not refer to the pursuit of science itself, but to part of the politi-
cal and policy-making process in which scientists offer their views or testimony. As 
such politically motivated interventions in the technical phase are not only illegiti-
mate but political actors should not be considered free to distort, misrepresent or 
otherwise (re)interpret the information provided in this phase. Nevertheless, politi-
cal actors remain free to ignore the technical input of science and scientists. Such a 
10 Whilst in my discussion of (bio)ethics and (bio)ethical expertise I did not make use the phrase 
‘formative intentions’ the way in which I have sought to construe the field of (bio)ethics mirrors 
Collins, Evans and Weinel’s understanding of science and scientific fields. Formative intentions 
have been equated with values (2010) as well as with ideals and vocabularies of motive (Collins 
et al. 2010: 191 & 198 note 10).
11 Particularly when it is scientific research that has raised questions for policy-makers to address, 
it is clear that technical phase must, in some way, precede the political phase. However, when one 
considers specific cases and the process through which they are addressed in more detail it is not 
simply the case that one follows the other. When properly examined such decision-making pro-
cesses are complex and move back and forth between their technical and political phases. Thus, the 
notion of a phase does not allude to their temporal sequence so much as to make metaphorical 
reference to their natures as being comparable different physical states, like gas or liquid (Collins 
and Evans 2007:  124 fn 17). The technical and political phases are, therefore, different social 
states, different contexts for ways of being or forms of life. Or, to my mind the better phrasing, 
different modes of social life.
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view might strike some as an attempt to (re)institutionalize the distinction between 
fact and value that wave 2 science studies has collapsed. However, Collins, Evans 
and Weinel deny that this is the case and insist that they rely on the different 
formative intentions of different cultures – the ideological values and norms of any 
(sub)cultural domain or field – such as ‘politics’ and ‘science.’ This, the notion that 
“policy- makers should value the judgment of experts – those who ‘know what they 
are talking about’” (Collins et al. 2010: 188) does not involve respecting science as, 
simply, a repository of facts or truth but as an important (sub)culture, and as an 
essential component of modernity. Indeed, as it involves electing to do so. It does 
not involve asserting the authority of science so much as adopting a particular political 
and evaluative stance with regard to that authority, its nature and limits, and its basis 
in the formative intentions of science and the values that underpin its practices.
To be clear, then, “what matters [for EM] is not that ‘science’, or scientific prac-
tice or scientific knowledge is chosen as the central element of our culture but that 
‘scientific values’ are seen as being a key part of a democratic society” (Collins 
et  al. 2010:  190). Indeed, consistent with the work of many others  – including 
Merton and Habermas – the values of science are not only seen as being congruent 
with those of democracy, but as sharing overlapping values to a reasonably large 
degree (Collins et al. 2010: 191–192). Nevertheless, the ‘formative intentions’ of 
science and democracy differ; they are different fields, with different concerns and 
purposes. Thus, whilst electing to be modern is a political choice regarding the pub-
lic and policy-making role of science, and the broader respect it is accorded, it is not 
only consistent with the (related and similarly modern) ‘choice’ to be democratic, 
and to value democracy, but can be represented as complimenting this broader com-
mitment (Collins et al. 2010: 191). As such the socio-political role of science and 
scientific knowledge cannot be (re)configured at will. Respecting a field of inquiry 
means respecting its norms, its values and the formative intentions that constitute 
and underlie the ‘community of practice.’ As Collins and Evans say: “Democracy 
cannot dominate every domain – that would destroy expertise – and expertise can-
not dominate every domain – that would destroy democracy” (2007: 8). A position 
that implies democracy and expertise should form a mutually supportive social 
compact.
What this means is that science can, after all, be demarcated from non- or pseudo- 
science but only in sociological terms. As such difficulties remain. Certain non- 
scientific fields may still resemble certain scientific fields. Nevertheless when we 
considered central examples such as, say, ‘biology’ and ‘(bio)ethics’ the decision to 
term one a science and the other a non-science is fairly easy to make. Elective mod-
ernism suggests we can think similarly for the distinction between science and poli-
tics as a whole. This thinking can then be transferred when deciding who is in a 
position to speak as a scientist, an expert or as someone who ‘knows what they are 
talking about’ and who does not occupy such a position. The formative intentions 
that constitute the sociological distinction between different fields also indicate 
whether or not the Locus of Legitimate Interpretation (Collins and Evans 2007: 
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119–121) should be restricted to those positioned within the field or if it can be 
extended to others. For example, consider a field where there is little restriction on 
who may legitimately interpret is products, namely the artistic field. Individual 
artists – who inhabit particular social fields, the norms, formative intentions or 
ideologies of which they follow or, at least espouse – produce works of art. However, 
these works of art are available for interpretation by all and not just those who 
inhabit the artist’s field. Aesthetic products – art, architecture, literature, fine foods 
and wines – can be legitimately interpreted by anyone.12
In contrast, the Locus of Legitimate Interpretation is far narrower when consid-
ered in relation to science. If one is to legitimately interpret scientific research one 
must be a contributory expert, or a very high level interactional expert. This is par-
ticularly true if one is to use such interpretation to conduct further scientific research. 
It also remains a reasonably strong condition for the interpretations that seek to 
(accurately) communicate scientific findings more generally. This restriction on 
legitimate interpretation is not, or so Collins (2010) suggests, the same as claiming 
that science is immune to criticisms leveled by non-scientists.13 Clearly it can be 
subject to better or worse forms of criticism by, say, (bio)ethicists or Wave 2 soci-
ologists. However, such criticism is rooted in alternative forms of expertise and, as 
such, it merely reinforces the duty of scientists to be clear when presenting and 
interpreting ‘the science’ to its wider audiences and publics.
Such a duty brings a final point into focus. It is rarely the case that the kind of 
interpretations required by non-scientists will involve the work of any one scientist. 
Rather, what is required are reports of the collective and consensus view of scien-
tists and a scientific field. Whilst there are always disputes and disagreements, the 
technical phase of policy-making process involves scientists providing expert testi-
mony as to the content and strength of the scientific consensus. Such expert testi-
mony is not beyond political criticism but, under elective modernism, it is beyond 
political (re)interpretation. As such whilst those involved in policy-making process 
must respect the expert scientific interpretation(s) that have been provided during 
the technical phase, this is not to say that such testimony must acted upon in the 
political phase. Experts have to be heard, but they do not have to be obeyed (Evans 
2014: 94). Nevertheless, where expert scientific advice is to be ignored or over- 
ruled there ought to be some acknowledgement of this fact. In short, “politicians 
must take responsibility for the policies they enact and be clear about the extent to 
which expert consensus supports these decisions” (Evans 2014: 94).
12 Of course, this is not to deny that there might be elite, or even expert, consumers or interpreters 
of such works and products. Connoisseurship is acknowledged as form of (meta)expertise and, 
furthermore, it is a term that can be applied to science, to scientists and, in particular, to those 
involved in the practical and political management of science and scientists (Bourdieu 1996; 
Collins and Evans 2007: 57–59).
13 Criticism by other scientists or those with scientific expertise such that they occupy the Locus of 
Legitimate Interpretation would, of course, not be an example of criticism but, rather, instances of 
further interpretation.
Elective Modernism and the Politics of (Bio)Ethical Expertise
32
4  (Bio)Ethical Expertise and Elective Modernism
Before considering whether or not the academic field of (bio)ethics can be appropri-
ately framed by the political perspective of elective modernism it is worth briefly 
considering a couple of points regarding the relationship between science and (bio)
ethics, and the fact that (bio)ethics is in important channel for the public communi-
cation of science. It is also worth reiterating that my concern is with (bio)ethics as a 
form of applied philosophical enquiry rather than bioethics more generally. This 
latter term names the field as a whole and so includes disciplines – such as sociol-
ogy, anthropology and history – that engage in broader and more critical forms of 
analysis that are socially, culturally, and historically – and not just logically or, in a 
somewhat limited sense of applied philosophy, ethically – reflexive. For these rea-
sons I do not think bioethics as a whole could be properly considered in terms of 
elective modernism.14 Nevertheless, considering its relevance to the more limited 
field of (bio)ethics will, I think, prove illuminating.
The relationship between science and (bio)ethics is an interesting one. Whilst the 
ethical evaluation of scientific facts may vary – consider the differing interpretations 
of the embryo’s moral status – participants in such moral debates must have if not a 
relatively undisputed and shared view of the facts then an electively modern one. 
Whatever the stripe of their intellectual and, perhaps more importantly, ethico- 
political perspective academic (bio)ethicists must relate to science in a way that 
akin to elective modernism. This is not to say that (bio)ethicists may not legiti-
mately disagree with the science or with a clinical perspective – some (bio)ethicists 
may have a reasonably high level of interactional expertise and, therefore, will be 
able to ask reasonably acute questions in the ‘technical phase.’ Nor is it to say that 
they are necessarily complicit with the scientists in the way suggested by some 
sociological accounts (cf. Evans 2012) although, of course, some might be. 
Nevertheless, for the most part, (bio)ethics is committed to the distinction between 
fact and value.15 Whilst (bio)ethicists enact this distinction methodologically, it is 
also present in the way such work is presented to its various publics, include scien-
tists, politicians and all those involved in policy-making. Thus, whilst there is 
(much) more to be said, elective modernism provides a potentially fruitful way to 
frame the relationship between science and (bio)ethics. It also suggests that insofar 
as (bio)ethicists are involved in the public communication of science – and, in my 
view, they are heavily involved in this endeavour – then part of what they do, 
communicating ‘the science,’ can be understood in terms of elective modernism.
14 The difference is, of course, the degree to which different forms of intellectual enquiry respect – 
or call into question – the ideological values of science and those that operate in practice.
15 In a response to an article discussing elective modernism (Collins et al. 2010) Fischer (2011), a 
sociologist of science, criticized the apparent revival of the fact-value distinction. However, as their 
ongoing support for Wave 2 Science studies shows, Collins, Evans and Weinel are not seeking to 
revive the fact-value distinction per se. Rather they are promoting the realization that the distinc-
tion between fact and value has, so to speak, value. Thus it may be adopted in some times, places 
and contexts whilst rejected in others.
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As interesting as these questions might be, they are not the particular concern of 
this essay. Rather, I wish to focus on the way the specific expertise of (bio)ethicists 
and the contribution it makes to policy-making processes might be understood in 
terms of elective modernism. In short, should non-(bio)ethicists take the expert 
advice – or ‘testimony’ – of (bio)ethicists in the same way as they do that of scien-
tists? In my work on (bio)ethical expertise I have positioned applied philosophical 
(bio)ethics as a distinct social field and as an important aspect of our contemporary 
and modern moral culture. Such positioning reflects Collins et al.’s (2010) under-
standing of science and scientific fields. Similarly, (bio)ethical expertise is distinc-
tive because of the formative intentions of this academic field; because of its 
socio-political and intellectual structure and the values that underlie and inform the 
research pursued and knowledge produced within the field. Furthermore, as is the 
case with science, when taken as a set the formative intentions of (bio)ethics, an 
academic discipline, are not to be found more generally. As such its products – jour-
nal articles – are not easily understood by the uninitiated. This is not to say that none 
of the values or norms of (bio)ethical discourse can be found outwith the academic 
field. Other fields can, of course, share certain values with (bio)ethics and, as is the 
case with science, (bio)ethics may have norms in common with the formative inten-
tions of democracy. Nevertheless, the formative and intended ends of democracy, 
(bio)ethics and science differ. Such a view would, then, appear to suggest that Locus 
of Legitimate Interpretation of (bio)ethics compares to that of science rather than 
art, suggesting that might be restricted to experts.
However there is a sense in which one could say the same of literary criticism. 
As an academic field it is fairly inaccessible. Nevertheless, the existence of this 
intellectual field does not mean that non-scholars are unable to read, enjoy and 
interpret novels for themselves. Rather, the academic field and the field of literary 
consumption exist alongside one another and, on at least some occasions, inter- 
relate with one another. For example, those who enjoy literature might be well 
advised to consider reading texts perceived by the academic field to be canonical, 
innovative or accomplished. Similarly, literary critics might be well advised to take 
note of popular culture and, in order to understand the value of popular works, its 
role, function and place in our literary cultures, to examine and engage with them as 
academics. Neither of these notions suggests that the views of experts in literary 
criticism are objectively superior to those of non-experts or, more accurately, those 
whose appreciation of literature is merely a function of ubiquitous expertise in the 
literary domain. Furthermore even if there may be something to gain for some, this 
does nothing to suggest that the ordinary reader has any particular need or use for 
expert literary criticism. Rather, it is merely to locate the field of literary criticism 
alongside, and as part of, our literary culture as a whole. This way of framing liter-
ary criticism is to reveal its relation to contemporary culture, a perspective that 
directly echoes the way in which elective modernism understands science as some-
thing related to and part of contemporary society and modern culture.
This same thinking can – indeed must – be transposed to (bio)ethics. The fact that 
(bio)ethics is an specialised field does not mean we should deny the legitimacy of 
medical doctors, life scientists or, indeed, lay persons interpreting their own moral 
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experiences. Nor should we think that such interpretations should be subordinated 
to those of experts. Rather we need a more sophisticated account, one that positions 
the specialist expertise of (bio)ethicists as an important part of our broader moral 
culture and sees it in relation to the ubiquitous moral expertise of ordinary moral 
actors. This is part of what I address in my previous work. The existence of ubiqui-
tous moral expertise and the nature of ordinary moral actors is such that we ought 
not blindly follow the advice, testimony or dictates of (bio)ethical experts. To do so 
would entail a significant abdication of our moral agency and, therefore, of our 
moral responsibilities. Nevertheless, if we are to be morally serious persons,16 then 
we would be well advised to take note of what (bio)ethical experts have to say and 
to consider, criticise and interpret it for ourselves. This is particularly true for those 
who act (or practice) within fields like medicine. The ethical issues that arise within 
the contexts of modern medicine are not necessarily ones that individuals will be 
well prepared to address on the basis of their ubiquitous moral expertise or, at least, 
it is not simply the case that they are well prepared to do so. Whilst healthcare pro-
fessionals – initiates to the field of medicine and healthcare – are morally socialized 
and ethically enculturated into this domain (Emmerich 2013, 2015b). The nature of 
this process, and of engaging in a relatively esoteric and specialised practice on an 
everyday basis, indicates the involvement and refinement or, better, contextual 
adjustment and development of the individual ubiquitous moral expertise. This is 
accomplished with the aid of the (bio)ethics, its literature and expertise.
This, then, indicates that there is a vital difference between ethics on the one 
hand and both science and aesthetics on the other when considered under conditions 
of elective modernism. Where the testimony of scientific experts can be criticised 
but not interpreted, and where the ordinary reader need not be concern themselves 
with the intellectual perspectives of literary critics, the case of (bio)ethical expertise 
differs.17 Not only must it be criticised and interpreted by non-experts, the perspec-
tive developed and presented by expert (bio)ethicists should be consider of particu-
lar interest and concern to those who actually address and even encounter the issues 
16 The phrase is a subversion of Radcliffe-Richards (2012) more prescriptive and rhetorically 
loaded use of the same term. Albeit implicitly, Radcliffe-Richards’ view would appear to suggest 
that all moral agents should become (bio)ethical experts, at least to the level of gaining significant 
interactional expertise with the field of applied ethics. At play here is a misguided assumption that 
extends what Narvaez and Lapsley (2005: 141) identify as the principle of phenomenalism – the 
notion that formal ethical reflection is a prerequisite for an act, behavior or practice to have ‘moral 
significance.’
17 It is, however, worth noting that it does not appear to apply to our ordinary or everyday ethical 
concerns but only to more specialist concerns of the kind raised by bioethics, business ethics, 
environmental ethics and so forth. We might ascribe this state of affairs to the way in which these 
domains require the careful evaluation of information, knowledge and perspectives that most are 
relatively uninformed about. A point that again highlights the role of bioethics in communicating 
‘the science.’ Nevertheless it remains the case that, for the most part, applied ethics seems remark-
ably ill-suited to commenting on the ordinary ethics and moral practices of everyday life. A point 
that is, I would suggest, borne out by recent anthropological research (Zigon 2008; Lambek 2010; 
Faubion 2011; Laidlaw 2013). In a similar vein, see Johnson’s (2014) remarkable and interdisci-
plinary ‘Morality for Human Beings.’
N. Emmerich
35
(bio)ethics analyses. Furthermore, this should not be seen as a one-way street. 
Expert (bio)ethicists should concern themselves with the fact that ordinary moral 
agents who encounter (bio)ethical issues will take an interest in their work. 
Consistent with elective modernism, expert (bio)ethicists should, then, endeavour to 
make themselves and their work accessible to ordinary moral actors and, in so 
doing, contribute to broader discussions of bioethical issues.18 Akin to the impor-
tance currently attached to the public communication of science we might think of 
the public understanding of (bio)ethics, with all that might be said to entail regard-
ing raising awareness and the need to engage as well as communicate with broader 
audiences.
What, then, might this mean for democratic politics and policy-making pro-
cesses? Clearly (bio)ethics – and bioethics more generally – should be viewed as an 
valuable part of our contemporary moral culture and the broader socio-political 
landscape. As such it has an important contribution to make with regards public 
debate, policy-making processes and, we might say, to the political life of a nation 
as a whole.19 Equally, insofar as it has the potential to close down ethico-political 
debate and the full participation of non-experts, (bio)ethical expertise may present 
a threat to such democratic endeavours. Thus, (bio)ethicists ought to take care when 
exercising their expertise in arenas beyond their academic home. Interestingly, such 
an injunction is not only normative but, in essence, concerns the ethical or ethico- 
political limits that apply to the exercise of (bio)ethical expertise. If we first con-
sider the use of (bio)ethical expertise in public debates then we might adopt certain 
standards of intellectual humility and generosity to our (expert and, in particular, 
non-expert) opponents. Furthermore, there is often a context-dependant case to be 
made for presenting a balanced opinion rather than, simply, advocating for a parti-
san position. Whilst the media often presents (bio)ethical debates in a ‘for and 
against’ format, the issues often require a more complex exposition if they are to be 
fully explored. Indeed, the ‘for and against’ format may itself be a source of imbal-
ance and misrepresentation. Thus, if it is to be ethical, the exercise of (bio)ethical 
expertise may require individual experts to present a range of ethical perspectives 
or, at least, to intimate the degree to which the academic debate contains ‘good 
faith’ diversity.
This latter point has more acute relevance when it comes to the use of (bio)ethi-
cal expertise in political and policy-making processes. Whilst public debates can 
still be construed as ethical debates per se, this is not the case when we consider the 
more formal processes of policy-making. Whilst some might suggest that ethics 
should precede politics, that it should be understood as providing political discourse 
18 This does not, of course, imply that expert (bio)ethicists cannot engage in more esoteric, complex 
and expert forms of discourse. Just they, when required, they should at least make some attempt to 
communicate and engage with non-experts.
19 Rosanvallon (2011) points out that politics and, indeed, policy-making, is not restricted to the 
work of the government but that, in modernity, has become ‘decentered’ with debates being dis-
tributed more widely. The UK’s Nuffield Council on Bioethics is a good example of this decenter-
ing, and of the broader (bio)ethicsts make to ‘the political life of a nation as a whole.’
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with prior constraints or limits (Radcliffe-Richards 2012: 134). This is a view that 
implies that ‘ethics’ does not or should not occur or recur in subsequent discourses. 
I do not think this is a tenable position as, so to speak, ‘the ethical’ is inescapable; 
it is part of all aspects of our social and socio-political lives. Nevertheless the role 
of (bio)ethical experts is not to become partisans in such debate nor, worse, to struc-
ture them in accordance with academic methodologies.20 Rather, on the basis of the 
fields cultural standing and formative intentions, (bio)ethicsts hold out the fields 
scholarship as a resource for political and policy-making debates, to (re)present the 
range of (bio)ethical perspectives and to do so both accurately and impartially. In so 
doing (bio)ethicists can contribute to the quality of political and policy-making dis-
courses. Such notions reflect the way in which elective modernism construes the 
political and policy-making role of science and scientists. Thus, it would appear that 
despite not being in a position to testify to ‘the facts,’ the political functions of (bio)
ethical expertise may bear significant comparisons with that of science. However, in 
order to maintain the notion that (bio)ethicists can contribute to political and policy- 
making process on the basis of their expertise we need to be able to distinguish 
between more than just expert and non-expert (bio)ethicists but between expert and 
pseudo-(bio)ethicists.
Whilst this iteration of the demarcation problem can, to some extent, be addressed 
in the way suggested by Collins and Evans, which is to say sociologically, problems 
remain. Consider, for example, the different academic, and therefore expert, 
approaches one can take to ethics. Whilst science is constituted by different fields – 
biology and chemistry for example – and whilst there is sometimes an overlapping 
focus – as, say, in the case of biochemistry – these fields are not in conflict. In con-
trast the substantive focus of different sub-fields of ethics not only overlap but are 
also in conflict over a range of substantive, methodological and meta-ethical issues. 
As such, whilst there may be such a thing as (bio)ethical expertise, and whilst there 
is some likelihood of there being a relatively widespread consensus – or, at least, a 
majority opinion – about the substantive position to take with regard a particular 
ethical issue, there is little to no chance that there will be agreement on the correct 
way to approach it (Toulmin 1981).
Of course, such things may or may not be taken as an indication that there is a 
fundamental problem with (bio)ethical expertise and/or its use within political and 
policy-making contexts. I tend not to think it overly problematic. Such disagree-
ment is not restricted to the domain of academic or specialist (bio)ethical expertise 
20 This way of thinking often appears to be anathema to (bio)ethicists. Consider, for example, the 
ethical compromise on embryo research set out by the Warnock Report. From an applied (bio)ethi-
cal perspective the position adopted is rationally indefensible and it has been criticized by (bio)
ethicists for this very failing (Harris 1985: 132). However, not only are there more nuanced views 
(Hammond-Browning 2015), consider the longevity and impact that the report has had on the regu-
latory landscape: it is, for example the basis of UK’s Human Fertilization and Embryological 
Authority (HFEA) and, therefore, of the approval it recently granted for genome editing research. 
In regards its influence, durability and, more importantly, its political balance the report has been 
an outstanding success (Wilson 2011).
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and any political process should be cognizant of the diversity of ethical perspectives 
that might bear on the substantive topic being addressed. Nevertheless there is, I 
think, a significant problem when it comes to the question of the degree to which we 
should prefer or prioritize the academic, specialist or specialized perspectives of 
(bio)ethical experts over those of ordinary moral agents, those who respond on the 
basis of their ubiquitous moral expertise alone. The existence of ubiquitous moral 
expertise, and the fact that specialist (bio)ethical expertise could not be developed 
without it, undermines a key aspect of the demarcation problem. Lest we forget the 
demarcation problem concerns the distinction between science and non- or pseudo- 
science. Whilst those working in science studies need worry about certain forms of 
lay expertise – Cumbrian sheep-farmers, say – their expertise is not a claim to sci-
entific knowledge per se, but to knowledge based on experience. In contrast the 
views of ubiquitous moral experts are ethical views. Whilst we can maintain a soci-
ological distinction between specialist (bio)ethical expertise and ubiquitous moral 
expertise, the fact that they both belong to the same class – morality – is one of the 
reasons that the testimony that specialist (bio)ethical experts provide in the techni-
cal phase cannot be considered beyond reinterpretation in the political phase. This 
view is reinforced by the principle of (moral) equality, understood as a formative 
intention or value shared by democracy and (many) moral and political philoso-
phies. Unless one has reason to think that they are held in ‘bad faith’ the formative 
intentions or values of modern society indicate that the views of all moral agents are 
deserving of our consideration and respect. Of course, that a particular moral view 
is held by some and that it therefore deserves consideration may not entail very 
much at all, and it certainly does not prevent us from engaging with it and those who 
hold it in further ethical and ethico-political debate. Nevertheless, one must con-
clude that there is no such thing as pseudo-ethics or pseudo-ethical perspectives.
Such concerns prevent us from committing to elective modernism when it comes 
to (bio)ethical expertise. Whilst (bio)ethics can be seen as an aspect of our moral 
culture, and not simply a resource, and whilst it can be appropriate to take particular 
note of the views held by (bio)ethicists in virtue of their specialist expertise, these 
cannot be considered to be beyond the (re)interpretation of other moral agents, even 
if they can only do so on the basis of their ubiquitous moral expertise. Furthermore, 
politics and policy-making should themselves be seen as moral endeavours. Indeed, 
given that, unlike science, politics and (bio)ethics are highly miscible – that it is 
very easy to slip from doing ethics into doing politics – we must actively work to 
ensure the political neutrality (or ‘objectivity’) of specialist (bio)ethical expertise. 
This is task that should weigh heavily on the shoulders of the expert (bio)ethicist 
and, ideally at least, on politicians. What this view suggests is, I think, that elective 
modernism is a political philosophy with particular relevance to contemporary rela-
tionship between science and society. However, once we configure our democratic 
processes to reflect this relationship it will have consequences in other areas, such 
as in the case of (bio)ethics. At the heart of elective modernism is a choice about the 
role of science and the relevance of the fact-value distinction to that role. Following 
this choice means that the distinction becomes procedurally institutionalised as 
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the technical phase and the political phase. Insofar as (bio)ethicsts adopt the same 
distinction, then they appear to fit well into the same schema. Nevertheless the 
notion that elective modernism can correctly frame the political contributions of 
(bio)ethical experts cannot be maintained as what they have to contribute are not 
matters of fact but ethical perspectives and matters of value, and, in the final analy-
sis, there can be no (expert) value – (lay) value distinction.
5  Conclusion
This essay has pursued the notion of (bio)ethical expertise and elective modernism 
with a view to their compatibility. The conclusion I have drawn is that in describing 
the relationship between science and society and its political role, elective modern-
ism has a significant influence on how we might understand the role of (bio)ethical 
expertise. Nevertheless, due to the fact that values are the focus of its enquiry the 
relationship between (bio)ethics and society is incompletely captured by elective 
modernism. Its influence might, then, be traced to the important role that science 
has to play in informing (bio)ethical discourse and, in turn, the role (bio)ethics plays 
in the broader communication of scientific perspectives. Somewhat ironically then, 
science and (bio)ethics are entangled by the very distinction that keeps them apart; 
both are inescapable related insofar as the formative intentions of both fields 
involves a methodological commitment to the independence of fact and value. 
However, where democratic politics can elect to respect the independence of facts it 
cannot indeed should not, do the same for values. This is because our values are 
interdependent, a notion that is present in the idea that science and democracy share 
certain values. Similar implications can be sketched with regards bioethics as a 
whole. Whilst (bio)ethics rarely concerns itself with democratic principles as part of 
its substantive analysis, this is not the sum total of the discipline’s endeavours. For 
example, Montgomery (2013, 2016) has recently argued for the value of public 
bioethics and for understanding bioethics as a governance practice.21
Such thinking points to a specific limitation in the way I have restricted my 
analysis of bioethical expertise to (bio)ethics. There are very few individuals who 
restrict themselves to (bio)ethics and, furthermore, much of the way I have dis-
cussed the ethics of (bio)ethical expertise implies that such experts should go 
beyond the practice of (bio)ethics alone. What I take this to mean is that the cultural 
tasks and socio-political roles fulfilled by bioethics are diverse, a fact that reflects 
the morally plural context in which it takes place and to which it must respond. 
Contra to what Radcliffe-Richards (2012) recommends, moral seriousness is not 
comprised of settling frameworks for ethical debates prior to the conduct of any 
concrete policy-making process. In short not only is (bio)ethical expertise not the 
sum total of morality neither is it comprised of (bio)ethical expertise plus some 
21 Of course the fact that, at the time of writing, Montgomery was Chair of the Nuffield Council for 
Bioethics is pertinent to his view, and vice versa.
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degree of political modulation via the views of the ‘lay’ public. In the context of 
contemporary or modern democracies, ethico-political decision-making ought to be 
seen as a complex, decentred, distributed and reflexive (Rosanvallon 2011) process 
that will never be entirely complete.
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